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ABSTRACT 
This report explores the extension of the conventional “kill chain” in a 
counterintuitive manner. Utilizing lessons learned from the SEA29 work in “Logistics in 
a Contested Environment,” the “kill chain” is re-defined backward from 
warhead detonation to “metal bending and metal delivery.” This process provides 
a more well-rounded examination of Department of Defense (DOD) efforts to 
maintain supply lines in a major conflict, specifically, those supply lines that 
provide key rare earth elements (REE) to DOD weapons contractors. Using 
linear programming and optimization, this report documents a design of three 
alternatives for the mining, refinement, and production of REEs. By defining a 
production equation around our Measures of Effectiveness and Performance (MOE/
MOP), we maximized the weighted MOPs while minimizing damage to convoys. From 
the analysis of results, we found REE components produced remotely (OCONUS) and 
near CONUS had the best results while using medium and large convoys. Finally, 
the diverse background of the team, professionally and academically, allowed for 
a combination of perspectives during the research and modeling process, which 
ultimately led to the creation of this final report. 
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A. BACKGROUND  
The 30th Systems Engineering Analysis (SEA30) cohort, with support from 
students in the National University of Singapore (NUS) Temasek Defense Systems 
Institute (TDSI) program and other students in various degree programs at the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS), were assigned by the Office of the Chief of Naval Personnel 
branch N9I (OPNAV N9I) to provide an analysis and solution to logistics support in a 
major conflict.  
SEA30 researched the backwards extension and re-defining of the “kill chain” to 
include the processes of metal bending and metal delivery. The association of a “kill chain” 
is tied to the commonly accepted and practiced Surface Warfare (SUW) and Air Warfare 
(AAW) methodologies of F2T2EA (find, fix, track, target, engage, assess) and DTE 
(detect, track, engage). SEA30 focused on the non-kinetic kill chain, the “industrial kill 
chain” discussed during the Warfare Innovation Continuum (WIC), which allows the 
United States Navy to have a kinetic kill chain at sea.  
Building off the initial tasking statement from the Systems Engineering Analysis 
Chair: 
Reaping lessons learned from all the WIC activities, analyze mission 
resilience in a major conflict by extending the “kill chain” from “metal 
bending to metal delivery.” This study will be a “demonstration of an 
analysis method” like the SEA 26 cohort that used set base design for force 
structure analysis. This will be an extension to the SEA29 work in 
“Logistics in Contested Environments.” As an example, select a critical 
mission like antisubmarine warfare then trace the way back from say, a 
lightweight torpedo (LWT) attack by an SH-60 on a SSK to all the elements 
required to make that happen, from manufacture, to material, to personnel, 
to logistics, in order see vulnerabilities in the entire kill chain, or in the case 
of weapon inventories, the 300th LWT drop. These would include, but not 
be limited to, critical metals in the LWT and their source; manpower and 
production capability at NUWC and manufacturing systems; logistics lift 
from manufacturer to APOE and SPOE sites; logistics lift to contingent 
bases; and for capability for re-arming at sea. (Matthew Boensel, email to 
authors, September 23, 2020) 
xviii 
The team conducted literature reviews, made boundaries and assumptions, and 
received feedback from the stakeholders to refine our tasking statement. Knowing the 
coming decades of global operations are not just about striking capabilities but also being 
able to operate continuously with limited or no resources in the face of supply disruptions 
triggered by an adversary. Therefore, we aim to model ways to increase the resilience of 
the operational supply chain to ensure continuous operational output in the face of 
an extended conflict with other global powers.  
B. MODELING 
The complexity of the model created is captured in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1. Processes Incorporated as Part of the Optimization 
Model 
Here one sees the four processes considered for the model: adversarial, logistics, 
production, and Rare Earth Element (REE). These processes were the foundation for the 
technical aspects of the model, shown in Figure 2.  
xix 
 
Figure 2. Technical Aspects of the Modeling Approach 
The red processes represent actions that may be executed by a potential adversary. 
Using simulation, these actions are generated by data inputs fed into the optimization 
model as scheduled attacks targeting specific routes traveled by convoys at certain times. 
The blue process is the operation of one’s force, which encompasses the movements of the 
various convoys along different routes, collection of REE materials, and component 
production at factories.  
Thus, outputs from the simulated red processes and the available data inputs are fed 
into the blue processes model. The model outputs are subsequently optimized using 
available large-scale optimization tools. In addition, the simulation model is further tuned 
where necessary to improve the robustness of the model design to produce reliable outputs 
when presented with different operational scenarios. The goal of the large-scale 
optimization model would be to derive the optimal combination of factors that would 
maximize the weighted MOPs (measures of performance).  
xx 
C. SCENARIO AND ALTERNATIVES 
Figure 3 depicts the overview of the input data used in the model. All input data 
used in the model were unclassified information and can be obtained from open source. 
Due to the limited information available in open source, some assumptions had to be made 
in order for the model to run and make the necessary analysis. The input data can be 
classified into four broad categories: (1) mines, (2) factories, (3) convoys, and (4) distances 
between location nodes.  
 
Figure 3. Overview of Input Data 
This overview was the centerpiece to create the three design alternatives for 
analysis. Alternative 1 is to Produce Locally, where component production is limited to 
within the Continental United States (CONUS). Alternative 2 is to Produce Remotely, 
expanding the production capability to outside the Continental United States (OCONUS) 
only. Finally, Alternative 3 is to Produce “Near Me,” where production is not limited 
geographically but optimized to the MOPs directly.  
xxi 
D. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
The optimization resulted in several interesting insights. First, when components 
were produced remotely and “Near Me” they tended to perform better and were almost 
identical when using medium or large convoys. Local production performed the worst in 
all convoy variants, which is a counterintuitive data point that can be explained by the lack 
of mining in CONUS. These metrics are shown in Figure 4.  
 
Figure 4. Normalized Objective Values by Alternative and 
Location of Production 
Our examined scenario has shown how flexibility in production location, referred 
to as Produce “Near Me” in this work, achieves the best results amongst the alternatives 
and variants explored. We have also noted that balanced fleet of fast-and-medium convoys 
offers a good mixture of the total balanced MOP as well as specific MOPs of interest. Our 
recommendation is to further explore this alternative in terms of Location Design and Fleet 
Design under additional scenarios. Such scenarios should include larger fleet design and 
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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Navy has entered a new era of operations commonly referred to 
as the Great Power Competition (GPC) between the United States and our near peer 
competitors to the East and West. We are continuously competing for an advantage in 
trade, technology, finance, and more specifically military strength to preserve the 
American world order. This order has stood since the split between China and Taiwan 
when the United States backed Chiang Kai-shek in 1920 until the defeat of his party in 
1949 (Culver 2020). Since the end of the conflict, the world stage has involved two key 
countries: the United States and Russia. Starting in 1979, however, China began to advance 
toward unification of Taiwan into the Communist Chinese Party (CCP). This process 
involved a rapid modernization of the Chinese military to the point of U.S.-themed power 
projection deployments around the globe. The actions taken by the CCP have led planners 
back to a Second World War color-coded plan aptly named by military professionals 
“Resurrecting War Plan Blue.”  
A. PROJECT BACKGROUND
The 30th Systems Engineering Analysis (SEA30) cohort, with support from
students in the National University of Singapore (NUS) Temasek Defense Systems 
Institute (TDSI) program and other students in various degree programs at the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS), were assigned to conduct this capstone to provide the Office 
of the Chief of Naval Personnel branch N9I (OPNAV N9I) an analysis and solution to 
logistics support in a major conflict. The group’s diversity allowed for a multi-disciplinary 
approach to the systems engineering process that resulted in a well-rounded problem 
definition, modeling, and analysis.  
1. Warfare Innovation Continuum
NPS hosts an annual conference known as the Warfare Innovation Continuum 
(WIC), which applies the efforts of military and civilian students and faculty from around 
the nation towards solving a relevant real-world problem. The focus of the 2020 WIC was 
“Resurrecting War Plan Blue,” a scenario where the United States is engaged in global war 
in 2035. The WIC week events and their integration into the SEA30 capstone process are 
shown in Figure 1.  
Figure 1. 2020 Warfare Innovation Continuum and Integration to 
SEA30. Source: Englehorn (2020). 
The WIC focused on four primary topics related to a future conflict: intelligence, 
reconnaissance, and surveillance (ISR) and defense technology; industrial resilience and 
supply chain vulnerability; intelligent autonomous systems (IAS) and biologics; and 
innovation. SEA30’s contributions centered on infrastructure, data, and workforce 
solutions to propose three concepts: A Resilient Infrastructure, Digital Thread, and a 
(Camo) Green New Deal. The first two concepts deal with connectivity and data security 
in agile manufacturing, and the third envisions a whole-of-society approach to develop 
human capital as a long-term resource (Englehorn 2020). From the activities of the 2020 




The tasking statement to the SEA30 group from the Systems Engineering Analysis 
Chair follows: 
Reaping lessons learned from all the WIC activities, analyze mission 
resilience in a major conflict by extending the “kill chain” from “metal 
bending to metal delivery.” This study will be a “demonstration of an 
analysis method” like the SEA 26 cohort that used set base design for force 
structure analysis. This will be an extension to the SEA29 work in 
“Logistics in Contested Environments.” As an example, select a critical 
mission like antisubmarine warfare then trace the way back from say, a 
lightweight torpedo (LWT) attack by an SH-60 on a SSK to all the elements 
required to make that happen, from manufacture, to material, to personnel, 
to logistics, in order see vulnerabilities in the entire kill chain, or in the case 
of weapon inventories, the 300th LWT drop. These would include, but not 
be limited to, critical metals in the LWT and their source; manpower and 
production capability at NUWC [Naval Undersea Warfare Center] and 
manufacturing systems; logistics lift from manufacturer to APOE [aerial 
port of embarkation] and SPOE [seaport of embarkation] sites; logistics lift 
to contingent bases; and for capability for re-arming at sea. (Matthew 
Boensel, email to authors, September 23, 2020) 
B. PROJECT TEAM COMPOSITION
The SEA30 team was composed of a diverse group of 20 students from different
NPS programs, and countries (Singapore, Israel, and the United States). The various 
services and specialties across the team allowed for a multitude of viewpoints and a more 
complete analysis of the tasking statement. The composition of the team and each team 
member’s country, service, and specialty are shown in Table 1.  
Table 1. SEA30 Team Composition 
Name Country Service Specialty 
Adrian Chua Singapore Air Force Air Force Engineer 
Alexander Kavall United States Navy Surface Warfare Officer 
Alvin Chan Baixian Singapore Civilian Systems Engineer 
Amit Carmeli Israel Army Software Engineer 
Axel Tan Choon Seng Singapore Army Infantry Officer 
Collin Hust United States Navy Surface Warfare Officer 
4 
Name Country Service Specialty 
Eugene Lee Boon Kien Singapore Air Force Air Force Engineer 
Jason Yap Kok Siong Singapore Civilian Operational T&E 
Joel Li Haocheng Singapore Army Ammunition Engineer 
Joseph Meier United States Marine Corps Aviation Maintenance 
Lim Wei Qin Singapore Air Force Air Force Engineer 
Marcus Tai Jia En Singapore Civilian Tracked Vehicle Development 
Marian Jester United States Navy Engineering Duty Officer 
Matthew McClary United States Army Special Forces 
Miroslav Bernkopf United States Marine Corps Aviation Supply 
Ng Wee San Singapore Air Force Air Force Engineer 
Nicholas Ng Wei 
Xiang Singapore Civilian Manufacturing Operations 
Owen Ong Wen Xiang Singapore Air Force Aircraft Weapons 
Peh Ming Hui Singapore Army Infantry Officer 
Robert Justin Morales 
Naquila Singapore Army Combat Engineer Officer 
 
Due to the scope of the problem, the SEA30 team was initially divided into three 
subgroups to streamline data gathering during the literature review process. The first 
subgroups focused on reviews of SEA26’s work, SEA29’s work, and Rare Earth Elements 
(REE). The review process led up to our first in progress review (IPR) and allowed the 
SEA30 team to revise the tasking statement into a problem statement. Following the first 
IPR, the teams were re-structured again from the literature review construct to a systems 
engineering (SE) team construct. The three teams in the SE construct were a research team, 
modeling team, and SE team. The research team worked to provide parameters and data-
based assumptions for the measure of effectiveness (MOE). This allowed the modeling 
team to build a model of the system, and the SE team worked to define assumptions, 
boundaries, and the measures of effectiveness and performance for the system. The 
separate teams are shown in Table 2.  
 
5 
Table 2. SEA30 Sub-Group Organization 
Research Team Adrian Chua 
Axel Tan Choon Seng 
Eugene Lee Boon Kien 
Jason Yap Kok Siong 
Joel Li Haocheng 
Marcus Tai Jia En 
Ng Wee San 
Owen Ong Wen Xiang 
Modeling Team Alvin Chan Baixian 
Amit Carmeli 
Joseph Meier 
Lim Wei Qin 
Marian Jester 
Nicholas Ng Wei Xiang 
Peh Ming Hui 
Robert Justin Morales Naquila 






The following chapters present the literature reviews the team did to support the 
formulation of the model exploring supply chain resiliency for REEs. The efforts of the 
team mirror the classical systems engineering V-Model, a logical project definition leading 
to implementation and finally test and integration. The steps are shown through our 
problem definition, requirements generation with stakeholder inputs, design of a model, 
implementation of the model through MOEs, and the testing of the model to analyze the 
results and provide recommendations.  
Chapter II focuses on the reviews and data collection performed before the first 
IPR. This gives the reader an insight into the importance of REEs in a major conflict, and 
the process of mining, refinement, and production. The chapter ends with an analysis of 
REE supply from multiple perspectives through a PESTLE (Political, Economic, Social, 
Technological, Legal, Environmental) analysis.  
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Chapter III presents the overview of the SE process the team used, beginning with 
stakeholder analysis, and ending with the creation of the model. The chapter also discusses 
the project boundaries and assumptions, critical issues, and measures of effectiveness and 
performance. These are linked to the research presented in the previous chapter.  
Chapter IV demonstrates our modeling approach, creation, and implementation. 
This gives the reader insight into why we chose our approach and the complexities 
contained within the model. Additionally, the chapter addresses portions of the model 
which are used in the following chapter for a sensitivity analysis.  
Chapter V includes the outputs from the model and the analysis of these outputs on 
the system. These outputs contain a baseline output, as well as outputs after changing 
parameters and variables in the model. This allowed for a robust set of recommendations 
for application of the model.  
Chapter VI provides recommendations for REE supply chain resiliency and 
methods of tailoring the process to various REEs. The recommendations are based off the 




II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS NAVPLAN 2021/BATTLEFORCE 2045 
The United States is currently locked in a great power competition with China, with 
frequent involvements by the Russians as well. The countries are competing 
simultaneously in multi-faceted domains, including trade, technology, financial markets, 
and military strength, with United States trying to retain its superpower status, while China 
attempts to gain global acceptance and recognition as a force to be reckoned with (Wilson 
Center 2021). 
The U.S. Navy (USN) is at the forefront in facing off against the threats posed by 
both China and Russia. Both China and Russia are actively pursuing strategies to gain 
unfair access and control over valuable resources beyond their exclusive economic zones 
(EEZ).  
1. Ascension of the Dragon: China 
China now possesses the world’s largest naval fleet and continues to rapidly 
modernize its weapon systems and platforms, including surface combatants, submarines, 
amphibious assault ships, aircraft carriers, and the next-generation fighter aircraft. China 
has not been afraid to showcase the superiority of its naval capabilities with its regional 
neighbors. As discussed in the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) NAVPLAN 2021 “this 
was done through a combination of unlawful claims over their regional neighbors’ 
territorial waters, and thinly veiled threats which were backed by China’s willingness to 
demonstrate its military prowess and technological superiority during exercises and test 
firing of live munitions” (Chief of Naval Operations 2021, 2). Case in point, most recently 
in early April 2021, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of China executed simultaneous 
military exercises east and west of Taiwan. At least ten PLA war planes, including fighter 
jets, anti-submarine warfare aircraft, and early warning aircraft entered Taiwan’s self-
declared air defense identification zone (ADIZ), a move that defense analysts stated was a 
warning to both Taiwan and the United States for being Taiwan’s primary supporter. Faced 
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with such aggressive posturing by China, the United States has labeled China as its “most 
pressing long-term strategic threat” (Lendon 2020).  
2. Awakening of the Hibernating Bear: Russia  
The Russian military has grown increasingly bold in the last decade and was 
starting to flex its military might again after remaining dormant ever since the end of Cold 
War and the dissolution of the old Soviet Union. This was evidenced by Russia’s 
clandestine annexation, or re-colonization, of Crimea in 2014, as noted by observers 
(Charron 2020). Interestingly, just days shy of President Joseph R. Biden’s first 100 days 
in the White House as the 46th President of the United States, Russia probed the U.S. limits 
again and made headlines by overtly amassing more than 100,000 military troops near the 
Ukrainian border and in the annexed Crime. On the naval front, the United States expressed 
its “deep concern” regarding Russia’s plan to enforce a blockade in parts of the Black Sea 
to prevent foreign naval ships and vessels from entering (Reuters 2021). Observers have 
likened Russia’s recent military actions as saber-rattling and posturing, and most likely 
done in a bid to remind Washington that Russia remains a force to be reckoned with, and 
that the Kremlin could easily reignite conflicts with the United States at will should its 
interests continue to be ignored (Reevell 2021). Today, Russia continues to be a formidable 
nuclear-powered adversary, having finally awakened from the chills of the Cold War, and 
is hungrily searching for an opportune time to strike.  
Against the backdrop of scenarios where near-peer adversaries are constantly vying 
for greater attention on the world stage, and possibly hoping to dethrone the world’s sole 
superpower, the U.S. military needs to rapidly build-up its forces. That formed the impetus 
for the Battle Force 2045, an ambitious plan proposed by the U.S. Navy which aims for a 
naval fleet expansion to the tune of 500 manned and unmanned ships by 2045, with the 
transitional goal of 355 traditional naval ships by 2035, while working within a resource 
constrained budgetary environment (Eckstein 2020). The Battle Force 2045 plan, as 
presented by former Defense Secretary Mark Esper in October 2020, entailed the 
following.  
1. To expand the attack submarine fleet from the existing 70 to 80. 
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2. To supplement the existing Nimitz-class and Ford-class nuclear-powered 
submarines with six to eight light aircraft carriers equipped with the future 
air wing, including the F-35 Joint Strike Fighters. 
3. To expand the usage of between 140 to 240 unmanned and optionally 
manned ships, both on the surface and subsurface, to conduct traditional 
naval missions, including mine-laying, missile strikes, and resupply. 
4. To increase and free up capacity of larger warships for more complex 
missions by expanding the fleet of smaller surface ships, such as frigates, 
from 60 to 70. 
5. To increase the logistics and resupply capabilities for distributed maritime 
operations by increasing the number of logistics ships from 70 to 90. 
6. To increase the employment of unmanned aircraft from aircraft carriers to 
cover missions traditionally undertaken by today’s air wings, including 
fighters, refueling, and early warning missions.  
7. To increase the level of integration of and synergy between the U.S. 
Marine Corps (USMC) and the main U.S. Navy forces, and to expand the 
fleet of amphibious warships from 50 to 60. (Eckstein 2020) 
B. RARE EARTH ELEMENTS 
In NAVPLAN 2021 and Battleforce 2045 (Sadler 2020), the Navy and the Joint 
Forces highlighted the need to deter an adversary’s aggression through projecting power 
and influencing ranges in a contested cyberspace and electromagnetic (EM) spectrum. This 
means there is a need for Navy and Joint Forces to employ the kill chain with a resilient 
network of sensors, command and control nodes, unmanned platforms, and weapons with 
increased range, speed, and persistence. REEs are critical for the assembly of these kill 
chain capabilities as they are required in manufacturing processes. Notably, the United 
States has limited influence over the supply chain of REEs as China has become the main 
producer and holds the highest reserve of REEs across the world, as seen in Figure 2 
(Garside 2021).  
Figure 2. Rare Earth Reserves Worldwide as of 2020, by Country. 
Source: Garside (2021). 
REEs, also called rare earth metals (REM), comprise 17 metallic elements 
(American Geosciences Institute 2021). They include the 15 lanthanides plus scandium and 
yttrium, and are often an essential constituent with minerals ore, which makes the REE 
production process expensive and complex.  
With their unique properties that can retain magnetic strength, amplification of 
energy, and resolution of signals in an elevated temperatures environment, REEs are ideal 
and crucial for military applications, such as Guidance and Control systems (Figure 3), 
Defense Electronic Warfare (Figure 4), Targeting and Weapon Systems (Figure 5), and 




Figure 3. Rare Earth Elements in Guidance and Control Systems. 
Adapted from Grasso (2013). 
 
Figure 4. Rare Earth Elements in Defense Electronic Warfare. 
Adapted from Grasso (2013). 
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Figure 5. Rare Earth Elements in Targeting and Weapon Systems. 
Adapted from Grasso (2013). 
 
Figure 6. Rare Earth Elements in Communication. Adapted from 
Grasso (2013). 
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With the changes to future warfare, the military’s increasing reliance on such 
capabilities is inevitable. The resources required for battle will no longer be just bullets or 
soldiers, but in fact will rely more on rare earth metals. For Navy and Joint Forces to 
maintain a constant influence over the adversary’s action, there is a need to hold a 
significant amount of REM reserve, ensure a constant and diversified supply chain 
especially during wartime, and secure sufficient in-house manufacturing and production 
capabilities, so that there will be no degraded capabilities during operation and that a 
constant edge over the adversaries can be maintained. In Figure 7, an example of the 
process of a mined ore, similar to REE, being produced into component is depicted.  
 
Figure 7. Generalized Rare Earth Materials Supply Chain for Metal 
Components. Adapted from GAO (2016). 
C. PESTLE ANALYSIS ON RARE EARTH ELEMENTS 
The PESTLE analysis was employed to further investigate the challenges that the 
U.S. faces regarding the supply chain for REEs. The name PESTLE refers to Political, 
Economic, Social, Technology, Legal, and Environmental factors. PESTLE analysis is a 
tool for situational analysis, which considers key aspects in the external environment and 
appraises each of them to form conclusions on current industry performance and future 
trends (Perera 2017).  
1. Political Aspects 
The United States faces a major issue in REE development for future production 
due to a lack of refining, alloying, and fabricating capacity. China, on the other hand, 
according to a 2013 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report “produces about 
95% of the REE raw materials, about 97% of rare earth oxides, and is the only exporter of 
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commercial quantities of rare earth metals” (Grasso 2013, 15). Noting the rise in U.S.-
China trade tensions in recent years, the United States is at risk from political measures 
that China may implement to limit the export of REEs. A prime example of such risk 
occurred in 2010, when China embargoed exports of rare earth oxides to Japan during a 
maritime border dispute. The embargo greatly threatened Japan’s high-tech industries and 
their export market as the rare earth oxides were used by automakers for products such as 
the Toyota Prius (Gholz 2014). During that period, the export control by China led to 
significant price increases world-wide, which affected the United States’ REE imports as 
seen in Figure 8.  
 
Figure 8. REE Price Trends 2007–2014. Source: Haque et al. (2014, 
623). 
As a result of the 2010 embargo by China, many other countries also started to look 
inwards and began efforts to develop mining and refining capabilities in their countries. 
Notably areas such as Europe and Australia have since explored new mining and refining 
sites, presenting potential ally partners that the United States can leverage to diversify its 
REE supply sources.  
2. Economic Aspects 
From the economics perspective, the lower mining and processing costs of REEs 
from China have also contributed to the world’s increased reliance on that country for these 
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processes and products (Bolton 2016). As seen in Figure 9, in a survey done in 2016 by the 
U.S. Department of Commerce on businesses that import REEs, 116 of the 211 vendors 
(approximately 50%) surveyed reported importing their REEs from China. In recent years 
there has also been an increase in the demand for REEs as they are being used in the 
commercial sectors for handheld phones, smartphones, and electric vehicles. With limited 
supply and increasing demand, it is not surprising that the “invisible hand’ of the free-
market economy would have driven and will continue to drive the prices of REE upwards. 
To ensure the United States continues to have a sustainable source of REE, it is imperative 
that new sources of REE should be explored. 
 
Figure 9. U.S. Department of Commerce Strategic Materials 
Assessment. Source: U.S. Dept. of Commerce (2016). 
3. Social Aspects 
REE extraction and processing results in chemical waste. A particular concern 
raised by Georgios Charalampides is “the common association of REE with thorium and 
uranium and thus the need to strictly control the dispersion of radioactive elements into the 
environment” (Charalampides et al. 2016). In addition, for mine operators, the exposure to 
respirable dust and chemicals have also tainted its image a profession. This negative image 
hinders the growth of mining capability in the United States.  
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4. Technological Aspects 
Other clean energy technologies have the potential to contribute significantly as 
REE demand increases in the longer term. These include grid storage batteries important 
for wind and solar energy storage, fuel cells used for vehicle propulsion, and nuclear power. 
According to a 2011 Department of Energy report, “unlike other commodities, REE mining 
generally does not appeal to the major global mining firms because it is a relatively small 
market (about $3 billion in 2010), is often less predictable and less transparent than other 
commodity markets, and the processing of rare earth elements into high-purity REOs is 
fundamentally a chemical process that is often highly specialized for specific customers” 
(Chu 2011, 53). This also means that the research funding from private entities for more 
efficient methods of extracting REEs may be limited since it is a niche market. Hence, it is 
necessary for the government to weigh in and provide research funding to alleviate REE 
shortages. Such research can be focused on the development of (1) alternative materials 
with similar material properties, (2) recycling of REEs, and (3) improving mining methods 
to improve REE extraction efficiency. 
5. Legal Aspects 
The REE supply chain is often heavily regulated and subject to certain procedures, 
especially at the early processes of extraction and separation. For example, mining on 
federal property in the United States requires a company to prepare and submit a plan of 
operations and a statement of environmental impact for approval before breaking ground 
on a mining site. At the various levels across the states, there are separate mining, 
reclamation, and environmental laws, as well as health and safety standards, that a 
company must follow prior to mining operations. This lengthy process of attaining permits 
for mining increases the complexity and cost of mine development and may discourage 
investors or banks from financing such projects. Thus, the growth of mining capability in 
the United States is hindered. 
6. Environmental Aspects 
In his article, Charalampides et al. also discussed the “presence of radioactive 
thorium and in some cases uranium in rare earth deposits where the concentration of 
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radioactive elements, usually relatively benign for human health in the ore body, rises 
significantly during beneficiation—a process during REE extraction” (Charalampides 
2016, 3). This waste by-product could be of serious concern. In addition, the process of 
REE extraction was also assessed to require high levels of water consumption, energy, and 
chemicals. While these factors are noted, the benefits of REE to the development of critical 
military technology may outweigh those concerns. It is not to say, however, that the 
environmental factors will necessarily be ignored. There exists current research focused on 
the recycling of REE to alleviate the demands from mining them.  
D. SUPPLY CHAIN RESILIENCE AND LESSONS LEARNED FROM SEA29 
This section concludes the literature review conducted by the SEA30 team with a 
discussion on Supply Chain Resilience and Lessons Learned from the SEA29 project. In 
Supply Chain Resilience we discuss four methods to enhance logistics resilience. Finally, 
in the lessons learned portion we discuss the key takeaways from the SEA29 project and 
their applicability to this report.  
1. Supply Chain Resilience 
From the PESTLE analysis just presented, we recognize the existing challenges 
pose a threat to REE supply chains internally and externally. Internally, the increasing 
investment and other measures can be taken to promote the growth of in-country REE 
mining capability and to research alternative materials with similar material properties. As 
for external considerations, the opportunities to capitalize on the global emphasis on REE 
should work with ally partners to diversify the supply chain as an option.  
An important aspect of material resources is the sustainability of the supply chain, 
even in a contested and dynamic environment. Due the importance of rare earth elements, 
the fragility of the supply chain as well as the environment is a concern. Although the REE 
supply chain was expected to increase exponentially, China unexpectedly introduced 
control of its REE export policy to rein in reckless and polluting practices of the mining 
process, which not only cut China’s export quotas by about 40% but also resulted in 
increasing the value of REEs by four times. The fact is that 80% of the REE supply in the 
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United States continues to come from China, which has the highest reserve of REE for 
export (Grasso 2013).  
In the aspect of supply chain, Sprecher defines resilience as “the capacity to supply 
enough of a given material to satisfy the demands of society, and to provide suitable 
alternatives if there are insufficient supplies” (Sprecher 2015, 6741).  
Therefore, the following paragraphs highlight various methods and provide suitable 
alternatives. To enhance resilience in the supply chain in terms of Resistance, Recovery, 
and Flexibility, it is important to consider the following requirements. Resistance is the 
ability to tolerate various forms of disturbances without a significant loss of function. 
Recovery refers to being quick to recover from a disruption to meet the supply chain goal 
within a short period of time. Flexibility refers to the ability to meet the demands of a 
supply chain with disruptions by switching.  
These are the following methods to enhance resilience in the supply chain: (A) For 
resistance, increase diversity with a variety of raw material sources to potentially reduce 
the impacts of disruptions on the supply chain, such as building more mines in different 
countries. Improve material properties by increasing the lifetime of products used 
intensively. Substitution is another method where one material is substituted for a different 
material. Additionally, consider technological substitution while re-engineering products 
to operate without any use of REEs. (B) For recovery, pre- and post-consumer recycling 
promotes the reuse and stockpiling of substances, which can act as a buffer to lessen the 
impact of temporary supply disruptions while also absorbing sudden price or demand 
supply fluctuations in an emergency. (C) For flexibility, consider implementing a mineral 
tax to promote the sustainable use of raw materials, redistributing profits made from the 
exploitation of non-renewable resources. Supporting research and development (R&D) 
also helps in bolstering the demand for other REEs by focusing on efforts to find new 
applications, or the resiliency of a supply chain as companies and governments partner to 
reduce the time needed to find solutions.  
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2. Lessons Learned from SEA 29-Logistics in a Contested Environment 
In the SEA29 report, four key ideas are examined: (i) Transport and delivery of 
logistics in contested environments. (ii) The effectiveness of various platforms and delivery 
methods. (iii) Utilization of well-defended convoys on supply routes. (iv) System 
survivability—radar cross section (RCS) and noise reduction. By adopting the waterfall 
modeling method, it is possible to refine the task for incorporating background research, 
stakeholder analysis, functional analysis. Various types of vessels are used for the 
modeling. (A) The Network Flow Model was used to determine maximum supply flow, as 
well as most critical ports and routes, and to assign specific assets to individual routes. (B) 
Monte-Carlo Simulation was used to compare performance based on RCS, acoustic 
signature, size, carrying capacity, self-defense capability, unit cost, and speed. (C) The 
Circulation Model provided insight into survivability given a layered threat.  
Results provided the following ideas for enhancing logistics resilience. (1) Adding 
defensive layers in conjunction with convoy operations offers the most significant 
improvement in successful delivery. Another good strategy is to unitize well-defended 
convoy operations on any supply route where bulk supply is supported. As for smaller 
deliveries, assets should be widely dispersed to minimize the chance that they are detected 
and engaged. (2) Another option is underwater operation delivery where survivability is 
higher if detected or engaged, as this method allows for the avoidance of surface threat 
layers, although it is time consuming and raises other risk factors. (3) Large, simple, 
commercial vessels should be used in defended convoys to convey large volumes across 
long haul routes to decrease cost per ton delivered. (4) Vessels highly susceptible to 
detection by sub-surface threats should be avoided or upgraded to minimize the threat. (5) 
RCS and noise reduction create a positive effect under certain conditions. Cost permitting, 
vessels should be upgraded prior to use within the logistics architecture. (6) Finally, to keep 
up with high attrition rates, any future logistics system must be inexpensive, rapidly 
replaceable, and either unmanned or minimally manned to reduce the loss of life.  
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III. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING 
A. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PROCESS 
To apply what we have learned at NPS and to create a starting point for this project, 
the SEA30 team had to decide on an SE model to follow that would structure the 
management of the capstone. From the three commonly accepted SE models, the Waterfall, 
Vee, and Spiral, shown in Figure 10, the team decided to utilize the “Vee” model for the 
project.  
 
Figure 10. Common Systems Engineering Process Models. Source: 
Blanchard and Fabrycky (2010, 36).  
The “Vee” model describes the “technical aspect of the project cycle” (Blanchard 
2010, 36) where the left side of the “Vee” involves the decomposition of a problem to 
create a system architecture and the right side integrates components and subsystems until 
the full system is operational and verified. At each step of the process there is a feedback 
loop to the user to ensure the user’s needs are being met throughout the project. The “Vee” 
provides a large amount of traceability from the beginning since each subsequent step 
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refers back to the system definition and requirements. These relationships are shown in 
greater detail in Figure 11.  
 
Figure 11. “Vee” Process Model. Source: Blanchard and Fabrycky 
(2010, 37).  
The next step for the team was tailoring the “Vee” process to an executable form 
of program management. The team chose a semi-checklist tailored “Vee,” which provided 
multiple checkpoints for stakeholder input as we progressed further with the project. The 
team began with the tasking statement and then developed the rest of the project based off 
the process shown in Figure 12.  
23 
 
Figure 12. SEA30 Tailored “Vee” Process Model 
The process shows the clear feedback loops to the Operational Needs and 
Requirements during each step for the process, from problem definition to system analysis. 
This loop aided in keeping the project on track and in line with the tasking statement.  
B. PROJECT BOUNDARIES AND ASSUMPTIONS 
The tasking statement for this project laid out a broad scope within which the 
SEA30 team had to work. The breadth of “metal bending to metal delivery” presented us 
with a variety of topics, all of which were valid paths for research, but we needed to scope 
and bound the problem space to formulate questions for stakeholders and eventually create 
a model of the problem. Following this thought process, we narrowed down a list of project 
boundaries and assumptions.  
1. Boundaries 
To bound the problem along the lines of the “Resurrecting War Plan Blue” GPC 
construct we limited the project to operations in the Pacific Region. This later helped the 
teams develop the appropriate MOEs and MOPs to model. We also determined the scope 
of the “kill chain” resiliency to begin with raw material mining and procurement, progress 
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to manufacturing and assembly, and end with distribution. The end point of distribution 
brings the SEA30 project up to the beginning of SEA29 project. We examined the 
resiliency of the process leading to distribution in a potentially contested environment. The 
project also models present-day industry practices to use for a resiliency analysis. Finally, 
we bounded the project to the electronic sector’s reliance on REEs for component 
production.  
2. Assumptions 
After bounding the project, we drew up assumptions based on the boundaries and 
the literature reviews. We assumed the full influence of relevant industries’ business 
models on the subsequent resilience analysis, the utmost cooperation from allied countries 
and trade partners, and uninterrupted communications and logistics operations within the 
Continental United States (CONUS). Along with the last assumption, we added the 
willingness of the United States to invest in and begin mining REEs within CONUS in the 
near future to overcome technological or environmental limitations to create new reserves 
of REEs. This would reduce or eliminate the reliance on REE supplies from a potential 
near peer competitor.  
C. STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS 
To validate our boundaries and assumptions, as well as gain insight from subject 
matter experts into the problem we were tasked with researching, the SEA30 team put 
together a stakeholder questionnaire to conduct the stakeholder analysis. Due to the nature 
of the 2020 pandemic, the stakeholder analysis was conducted solely via email. 
Nonetheless, even with communication limitations the team was still able to gain insight 
outside our realms of experience and receive guidance past our own assumptions on where 
to further our efforts. Each stakeholder involved in the project had his or her own insight 
to add, as is shown in Table 3.  
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Table 3. List of Stakeholders 
Stakeholder Title Primitive Need 
VADM Ricky 
Williamson, USN 
Deputy Chief of Naval 
Operations for Fleet Readiness 
and Logistics (OPNAVN4) Insight, analysis, and 
recommendations for 
logistics systems, 
architectures, and concepts 
of operations. 
Recommendations to close 
capability gaps with 
identification of tradeoffs. 
RADM Daniel 
Fillion, USN 
Director, Warfare Integration 
(OPNAVN9I) 
CAPT (Ret) Michael 
Stewart 
Deputy Director, Integrated 
Warfare(N9IB) 
CAPT Eric Morgan, 
USN 
OPNAV N4iL – Logistics 
Analytics Branch (LAB) 
CAPT (Ret) Jeffrey 
Kline 
OPNAV N9I Chair, Systems 
Engineering Analysis Completion of graduation 
requirements. 
Relevant recommendations 
to OPNAV N9I. 
CDR (Ret) Matthew 
Boensel 
OPNAV N9I Chair, Systems 
Engineering Analysis 
Dr. Jefferson Huang Operations Research Advisor 
Completion of graduation 
requirements. 
Relevant recommendations 
to OPNAV N9I. 
Challenging and rewarding 
academic experience. 
Dr. Fotis Papoulias Systems Engineering Advisor 
SEA30 Student 
Cohort 
  Completion of graduation 
requirements. 
Application of critical 
thinking and reinforcement 
of curricula skills. 
 
We sent each of the stakeholders a list of ten questions, vetted through the NPS 
Institutional Review Board (IRB). The questions and their focus are shown in Table 4.  
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Table 4. Stakeholder Questionnaire 
No. Question Aim 
1 Rank importance of 
capabilities needed in the 
“kill chain.”  
Identify importance of these 
capabilities in the “kill chain” 
following the production in 
industry.  
2 What is a realistic budget to 
constrain our solutions?  
Identify a realistic budget 
constraint to produce components.  
3 Top 3 effective ways of 
incentivizing a skilled USN 
maintenance force.  
Identify means to enhance the 
maintenance workforce.  
4 USN preference for 
insourcing/outsourcing 
maintenance.  
Explore potential of the Navy 
having contractors and sailors 
doing maintenance onboard.  
5 How the USN sees regional 
allies and strategic partners 
as part of the solution.  
Identify level of responsibility to 
which we share with Allies in 
future wars, especially when the 
distance to the fight is far.  
6 Should the eventual 
“sensitivity analysis” be 
focused on variables which 
are within USN/DOD’s 
scope of influence or 
Industry-wide/National scope 
of influence? 
Scope the analysis to how much 
leverage we can obtain.  
7 Rank the top 3 areas of Naval 
warfare which unmanned 
ships would play the greatest 
role.  
Identify future of unmanned 
vessels in the next decade or two, 
where is the emphasis going to be. 
8 Rank the following spheres 
of influence that an 
adversary’s control of rare 
earth element has.  
Identify the barriers to controlling 
REEs.  
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No. Question Aim 
9 Rank the following areas of 
concern that the USN would 
have by 2035.  
Identify, with manned vessels and 
the weapons onboard, what the 
primary concern will be by 2035. 
Determine the effects of where the 
supplies and REEs are drawn from 
and distributed.  
10 Rank the reliance of the 
following industries on 
foreign 
companies/stakeholder.  
Identify which industry is most 
reliant on foreign companies, 
electronics, metal fabrication, 
mining, or oil/energy.  
 
The full graphical representation of the stakeholder responses is shown in Appendix 
A. To refine the tasking statement into a problem definition, the team focused on the 
responses to questions about the importance of capabilities, the role of regional allies and 
partners, the focus of the sensitivity analysis, the impact of adversary control of REEs, and 
sector reliance on foreign companies.  
The responses to the first question aligned with our expectations for future 
capabilities, especially against a near peer competitor. Given the importance of intelligence 
gathering in the current Navy, the need for continued development of ISR capabilities will 




Figure 13. Stakeholder Response to Importance of Capabilities 
The question relating to the role of regional allies deals with the level of shared 
responsibility allies would have in a future conflict. This translates to providing security 
for REE shipments should they come from overseas as well. The response from the 
stakeholders is shown in Figure 14.  
 
Figure 14. Stakeholder Response to Role of Regional Allies and 
Partners 
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The SEA30 team had a proposed direction for the eventual sensitivity analysis, 
which was shared by the stakeholders as well. Since the scope of the project deals with the 
Department of Defense (DOD) working with the commercial sector, the analysis logically 
should include efforts at both the commercial and national government levels. This is 
shown in Figure 15.  
 
Figure 15. Stakeholder Response to Focus of Sensitivity Analysis 
The final two questions used to refine our tasking statement were fundamentally 
linked. The impact of an adversary’s control of REEs and the reliance of sectors on foreign 
companies was previously demonstrated in Figure 8 where China placed an embargo on 
REEs in 2010. This led to an increase in prices for goods that required those REEs and for 
countries to begin looking at other ways to acquire those REEs. The primary concern for 
this project is centered on the military, shown in Figure 16, and the sector most reliant on 
REEs is the electronics sector as shown in Figure 17.  
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Figure 16. Stakeholder Response to Impact of Adversary’s Control of 
REEs 
 
Figure 17. Stakeholder Response to Sector Reliance on Foreign 
Companies 
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D. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Taking into consideration the literature reviews, boundaries and assumptions, and 
feedback from the stakeholders, we were able to refine our tasking statement. We know 
the coming decades of global operations are not just about striking capabilities but also 
being able to continuously operate with limited or no resources in the face of adversarial 
supply chain disruptions. As such, improving our operational logistics framework by 
extending the kill chain to a global process capitalizing on multi-national alliances and 
military-industry partnerships will be a deciding factor in creating long-term resilience in 
our “metal-delivery” capabilities. Therefore, we aim to model ways to increase the 
resilience of the operational supply chain to ensure continuous operational output in 
the face of an extended conflict with other global powers. 
The development of this problem statement allowed us to continue with the SE 
process and perform a functional decomposition, functional flow, and identification of 
critical operation issues (COI).  
E. OPERATIONAL CONCEPT 
From the problem statement we developed the high-level operational concept of the 
entire system that considers the stages of the mining to distribution process. In Figure 18 
the system flows from right to left to signify our focus on the backside logistical 
architecture of obtaining, refining, and delivering Rare Earth Elements before the weapons 
manufacturing process. The steps of the system are defined as (1) the mining and trading 
or obtainment of REE; (2) the refinement, manufacturing, and assembly; and (3) the 
distribution or delivery of the REE. At which point our research connects with the previous 
capstone teams for achieving the “last mile” movement from the weapons manufacturer to 
the area of operation.  
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Figure 18. High-Level Operational Concept 
F. FUNCTIONAL DECOMPOSITION 
Within our system we have a three-level functional decomposition which includes 
the hierarchical relationship of subordinate functions within four major compartments of 
the system that generally coincide with the operational concept shown in Figure 15. This 
ensures the traceability of our system requirements and functions as we progress. The 
compartments are color-coded in Figure 19 for ease of reference and expanded as a list for 
readability. There you see the first compartment as performing administrative 
requirements, which include processing the order, selecting the mode of transportation, 
planning the route, and coordinating with the host nation (HN) that we might be mining in 
or transporting through. This process is followed by the obtainment of the REE, which 
includes the extraction, preparation, and delivery to the refineries where purification, 
packaging, and preparation occurs for the final delivery process where security is assigned, 
and the package is moved and defended before arriving at the destination.  
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Figure 19. System Functional Decomposition 
1. Perform Administrative Requirements 
i) Process Order 
ii) Plan Mode/Route of Transport 
iii) Coordinate with HN 
2. Obtain REE 
i) Extract Raw Material 
ii) Prepare Material for Transport 
iii) Deliver Raw Material 
3. Refine REE 
i) Purify Raw Material 
ii) Package REE in accordance with Order 
iii) Prepare REE for Transport 
4. Deliver REE 
i) Assign Security 
ii) Move Package to Destination 
iii) Defend Shipment 
G. FUNCTIONAL FLOW BLOCK DIAGRAM 
The Functional Flow Block Diagram (FFBD) provides a time-sequenced step-by-
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concept and functional decomposition. The administrative requirements, however, are 
interspersed among those three top-level functions. In this case, the process begins with 
receiving the logistical request at which point we have the option to mine locally, abroad, 
or draw from reserves. Then after selecting the most appropriate mode of transportation, 
we move the material by land, sea, or air before refinement takes place via commercial, 
military, or allied mechanisms. Overall, this basic FFBD provides an initial framework for 
the modeling team to begin building the necessary models and simulations. As the project 
moves forward, we will develop this diagram, shown in Figure 20, to include the inputs 
and outputs that will act as the entities of flow throughout.  
 
Figure 20. System Functional Flow Block Diagram 
The FFBD shows the three COIs the team decomposed in the system,  
1. Availability – obtaining the REE from a local, overseas, or reserve source.  
2. Transportability – moving the material via land, sea, or air.  
3. Producibility – refining the raw material using commercial, government, 
or allied factories.  
This list was further decomposed into the MOEs and MOPs for the system to 
provide metrics the modeling team could utilize to build a representation of the system and 
identify areas for a sensitivity analysis.  
H. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS AND PERFORMANCE 
The development of MOEs and MOPs is rooted in the definition of how well the 
system accomplishes a mission and how well the system accomplishes tasks. After COIs 
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are defined, System Operational Requirements (SOR) are used in the next step of 
requirements decomposition to describe clear MOEs and MOPs. From the SORs, mission 
accomplishment is defined by MOEs, while task accomplishment is defined by MOPs. 
Finally, MOPs are described by Data Requirements (DR). These measures and 
requirements are used to build the model of the system, with definable parameters for 
analysis.  
Beginning with Availability, the COI was further broken down into the SORs of 
operational availability, asset density, and reliability focused on the mining aspect. 
Operational availability was associated with the mean time between maintenance and 
downtime of the mining facility, as well as the percentage of REEs attainable from the 
source. The asset density refers to the average distance to the nearest source of REEs, i.e., 
how far a mine must drill or excavate to arrive at raw materials. Finally, reliability deals 
with the ability of the mine to consistently produce REEs, the quality of the REEs, and the 
yield capacity of the mine.  
Next, Producibility focused on the rate of production for commercial, allied, and 
government manufacturing and the REE quality post-refinement. The SOR is reliant on the 
time needed to refine the REE and the percentage of by-product produced. These DRs in 
turn calculate the quality of the REEs and whether they meet purity standards.  
The final COI, Transportability, decomposes into the transportation capacity, time, 
availability, effectiveness, asset readiness, security, and capacity. These are linked to the 
post-refinement process of moving the REE to the manufacturer. Therefore, we are 
interested in the average volume transported, the mean delivery time, and the rate of 
successful deliveries. We defined three avenues of transportation among land, sea, and air, 
with DRs to capture the most efficient assets. Finally, since we are planning for, at the 
least, contested logistics, the security of transportation is taken into consideration with the 
package damage rate. This rate is effectively the number of successful convoy deliveries 
between refineries and manufacturers.  
The complete decomposed list of SORs is catalogued in Appendix B.  
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In this chapter, we discuss the process of modeling a logistics supply chain in the 
context of our design. We note that the key functionalities of the system have already been 
covered and the differences between potential alternatives stem from specific data-oriented 
decisions, such as where to produce components. As such, our modeling approach first 
develops a general mathematical model that can address any of our alternatives and then 
proceeds to explain how the alternatives differ from each other.  
The complexity of modeling the logistics supply chain for our system is evident in 
Figure 21. Our model must account for many elements interacting with each other across 
time. The dependency of our model on many data elements also requires a precise 
definition of the examined scenario or scenarios used for alternative analysis and 
performance evaluation.  
 
Figure 21. Processes Incorporated as Part of the Optimization Model 
for Simulation of Various Possible Scenarios 
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1. Processes Covered by the Model  
The processes shown in Figure 21 are discussed in detail in the following list.  
a. Adversarial Processes  
• These are processes that simulate potential adversarial attacks against 
specific logistic targets, such as the transportation convoys, in order to 
hinder and disrupt the logistics supply chain of the force. These processes 
are stochastic in nature and were thus randomly generated as part of the 
various modelling scenarios explored.  
b. Logistics Processes  
• Various options on possible transportation convoys across different 
operating domains (aerial, naval) were incorporated as part of the model. 
The carrying capacity and velocity of the various convoy types were also 
accounted for within the model. 
• Route planning abilities for the transportation convoys was also adopted 
for the shipment of REE materials from various REE mines to factories. 
• Collection of materials from different locations, and delivery of those 
materials to their destinations. 
c. Production Processes  
• Requirement- focused and time- conscious production of system 
components by the factories, where the minimal amount of material must 
be met to begin production, in order to meet the desired overall demand by 
the force in a timely manner. 
d. REE Processes 
• Capacity- conscious mining and time- conscious refinement of desired 
REE material volume to meet overall demand by the production factories. 
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2. Processes Not Covered by the Model  
Importantly, we note that once components have been produced, our model 
assumes the factory is their final destination. Consequently, we say our model is concerned 
with production logistics, but not operational logistics. Our system is therefore expected to 
be integrated with SEA29’s Logistics in a Contested Environment project (Bengigi et al. 
2020) such that our model essentially extends the logistics supply chain from delivery of 
components to their operational-oriented destination, to delivery of material from its source 
until it is transformed into a usable component. 
An overview on the technical aspects adopted in the modeling approach is shown 
in Figure 22.  
 
Figure 22. Technical Aspects of the Modeling Approach 
Red processes represent plausible actions that might be executed by potential 
adversaries. Using simulation, these processes are generated as a data input that is fed into 
the optimization model as scheduled attacks targeting specific routes traveled by convoys 
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at certain times along the event horizon for each scenario simulation run. Hence, by 
utilizing data collected from available sources or by using reasonable estimates, red 
processes can be simulated either by using scenario-specific behavior or via stochastic 
means.  
Blue processes represent the operations of one’s force, which encompass the 
movements of the various convoys along the different routes, collection of REE materials, 
and component production at the various production factories. These were all captured to 
a reasonable degree within the large-scale optimization model. 
Thus, simulated red processes outputs and available data inputs are fed into the blue 
processes model. The model outputs are subsequently optimized using available large-
scale optimization tools. In addition, the simulation model is further tuned where necessary 
to improve the robustness of the model design to produce reliable outputs when presented 
with different operational scenarios.  
The goal of the large-scale optimization model would be to derive the optimal 
combination of factors that would maximize the weighted MOPs. The various factors 
encompass the movement of convoys between locations, the availability of REE materials 
from each REE mine, the materials collected by each respective convoy and corresponding 
material volume, as well as the production plan and production timing for each of the 
factories within the model.  
Within the model, red processes are generated using a simulation model, with its 
outputs fed into the large-scale optimization model as scheduled attacks targeting specific 
routes that convoys travel along at certain times in the event time horizon as part of the 
respective simulation runs. Hence, if a simulated convoy happens to be traveling along a 
route at the same time as an adversary, an “Encounter” is determined to have occurred. 
Each “Encounter” is simulated using a model like the Hughes Salvo equations (Hughes 
1995) that will result in the convoy sustaining some damage that is translated into the loss 
of carried material. Hence, convoys not transporting any materials are deemed to be most 
vulnerable to such attacks. In addition, the model does not account for potential shipping 
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delays experienced by the convoys during the production of components by the various 
factories.  
B. METHODS AND TOOLS  
The optimization model developed strives to capture various elements/processes of 
interest, and their corresponding interaction effects over time. Thus, the scale of the model 
can be considered to be large in terms of overall development complexity. Various tools 
and techniques were thus adopted as part of the model development, in order to obtain 
results from the model in a time effective and efficient manner.  
The various techniques and tools used to develop the simulation and large-scale 
optimization model used in this study are further discussed. 
a. Pyomo Model 
Pyomo (Hart et al. 2017) is a software package designed in the Python 
programming language (Van Rossum 2007) that can be used to easily build large-scale 
objected-oriented optimization models, and specifically, integer-programming models.  
b. Data Farming  
The model was also designed to be ‘data farmable’ (Sanchez et al. 2020) to allow 
for analysis using suitable statistical and visualization techniques from which to derive 
potentially useful insights from the model outputs. Our model can make use of a Design-
of-Experiment (DOE) input that can help us test the limits of the model under various 
scenarios.  
c. Additional Tools  
The analysis accompanying the model outputs (further discussed in the next 
chapter) includes graphics or evaluations by JMP software (Jones 2011).  
C. ASSUMPTIONS  
There were several elements incorporated as part of the model, such as convoys, 
REE mines, factories, and production processes. These elements also potentially include 
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various sub-types, for example convoys could possibly include aerial and naval assets. 
Moreover, due to the classification of this study, the amount of available data is limited in 
scope. Therefore, several assumptions had to made in the development of the simulation 
and large-scale optimization model. These assumptions can be broadly categorized into 
either data assumptions or model assumptions. We describe the data assumptions in the 
context of examined scenarios here.  
a. Convoy Related Assumptions 
• Routes traversed by convoys between locations are two-way routes of 
equal length. These routes form a connected network. 
• Convoys travel with a constant speed along routes. 
• Convoys can be deployed at the start of the time period from any location 
within the simulation model.  
• A deployment period for convoys is considered in obtaining the set of 
feasible optimal solutions. 
• Convoy entities are never destroyed by enemy attacks in the model, only 
the materials carried by the convoys can be ‘lost’. 
b. Material Related Assumptions 
• Unloading/loading of materials from convoys at various locations requires 
a constant time period. 
• The volume of materials loaded/unloaded from a convoy is limited. 
• From each REE mine, a constant rate of raw material mining is assumed. 
• A constant rate for material refining is also assumed. 
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c. Production Related Assumptions 
• Factories can produce the same weapon system components with the same 
production procedures but differ in production time and efficiency. 
d. Adversary Assumptions 
• Adversaries can be detected but cannot be fended off by convoys. 
• Adversaries can launch targeted attacks on routes by causing damage to 
convoys traversing on the same route at the same time. 
• Adversarial units attack convoys with the same amount of offensive 
damage. The damage is equivalent across all adversarial units. 
D. MATHEMATICAL MODEL DESCRIPTION 
This section discusses the mathematical formulation of our model elements.  
1. Optimization Model 
The first part of the model is a mixed-integer programming model that aims to 
maximize our MOEs by using the data to decide an optimal allocation of resources. The 
model creates an optimal route plan for each of the convoys as well as a plan to carry 
materials from mines to factories for production. 
The key objects in the model include:  
• Convoys. Convoys can be aerial or naval, each independently moving 
between different locations of interest around the globe. The convoys can 
load or unload material from each location. In addition, convoys can be 
damaged, as detailed later in this chapter. 
• Location. The locations in this model represent places around the globe of 
interest, usually mines or factories. We note that locations with no 
indicated purpose can serve as storage facilities.  
44 
• Mines produce a rare-earth metal that can be used to produce 
weapon components. The material in each mine is limited and 
grows with time, as more material is excavated. 
• Factories can transform material into weapon components. The 
production process is shown in the sets of objects.  
2. Combat Model  
The combat model is inspired by Hughes’ Salvo equations (Hughes, 1995). 
Assumptions of this model include: 
• Enemies attack a convoy that traces its route along the same route as that 
enemy during the same time unit.  
• Enemies only attack a convoy for that time unit and do not engage it 
otherwise.  
• However, enemies will attack ALL convoys along that route.  
• Enemies are indestructible. The model is centered around the damage a 
convoy sustains and the loss of material resulting from that damage.  
3. Mixed-Integer Programming Formulation  
We can now begin describing several notations to our data.  
a. Sets of Objects  
• 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆: the set of all measures-of-performance of interest.  
• 𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿: the set of all locations of interest.  
• 𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴. 𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿 ⊂ 𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿: the subset of all allied (non-U.S.) locations.  
• 𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆: the subset of all locations that are mines.  
• 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆: the subset of all locations that are factories.  
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• 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴: the set of all rare earth elements of interest.  
• 𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆: the set of all weapons of interest.  
• 𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆 ⊂ 𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿 × 𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿: the set of all routes between locations. Note that 
not every pair of locations has a route between them. Routes are not 
necessarily symmetric.  
• 𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆: the set of all convoys of interest. This is assumed to be fixed.  
• 𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆: the set of all enemies.  
• 𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹: the set of all affiliations (countries).  
b. Object Information of Interest  
• 𝐹𝐹 ∈ ℕ+ is the maximum time-unit. We call 𝐻𝐻 = {1,2, … ,𝐹𝐹} the time 
horizon. 
• For an 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆:  
• 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 ∈ ℝ is a weight for that MOP. 
• For a route 𝑟𝑟 ∈ 𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆: 
• 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟 ∈ ℕ+: is the length of the route. 
• 𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟 ∈ 𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿: is the source location of the route. 
• 𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟 ∈ 𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿: is the destination location of the route. 
• Routes are not necessarily symmetric. 
• Given a convoy with a speed 𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐, we let 𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐺𝑟𝑟,𝑐𝑐 be the set of legs 
required for the convoy to traverse the route (rounded up). 
Formally, 𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐺𝑟𝑟,𝑐𝑐 = {1,2, … , �
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟
𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐
�} . We also denote by 𝑘𝑘𝑟𝑟,𝑐𝑐 ∈
𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐺𝑟𝑟,𝑐𝑐  the maximal leg. 
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• For a location ℓ ∈ 𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿: 
• 𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿ℓ ⊂ 𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆: is a subset of routes starting at ℓ. 
• 𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹ℓ ⊂ 𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆: is a subset of routes ending at ℓ. 
• 𝑐𝑐ℓ ∈ ℝ+ is the capacity of the location. 
• 𝑞𝑞ℓ ∈ 𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 is the affiliation of the location.  
• For a mine 𝑚𝑚 ∈ 𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆: 
• 𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚 ∈ 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 is the rare earth metal produced by that mine. 
• 𝑣𝑣𝑚𝑚0 ∈ ℝ+ is the initial volume of that material in that mine. 
• Δ𝑣𝑣𝑚𝑚 ∈ ℝ+ is the volume of that material mined at each time unit. 
• For a rare earth metal 𝑙𝑙 ∈ 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴: 
• 𝛼𝛼𝑙𝑙 ∈ (0,1) is the refinement rate for that material. 
• For a factory 𝑓𝑓 ∈ 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆: 
• 𝑓𝑓𝑤𝑤 ⊂ 𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆 is the subset of weapons that factory can 
produce. 
• ∀𝑤𝑤 ∈ 𝑓𝑓𝑤𝑤: 𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓,𝑤𝑤 ∈ ℕ+ is the number of time units required to 
produce a weapon 𝑤𝑤 by factory 𝑓𝑓. 
• For a weapon 𝑤𝑤 ∈ 𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆: 
• 𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙 ⊂ 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 is the subset of rare earth elements required to produce 
that weapon. 
• ∀𝑙𝑙 ∈ 𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙: 𝑣𝑣𝑤𝑤,𝑙𝑙 ∈ ℝ+ is the required volume of that element to 
produce a single unit of the weapon. 
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• For a convoy 𝑐𝑐 ∈ 𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆: 
• 𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐 ∈ ℕ+: is the speed of the convoy. 
• 𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐 ∈ ℝ: is the capacity of the convoy. 
• ℓ𝑐𝑐 ∈ 𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿 ∪ {∅}: is the initial location of the convoy (can be null, 
so as to specify it be can anywhere in the world per our choosing). 
• 𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐 ∈ ℝ: is the counterfire strength of the convoy. 
• 𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐 ∈ ℝ: is the defense of the convoy 
• For an enemy 𝑎𝑎 ∈ 𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆: 
• 𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎 ∈ 𝐻𝐻: is the time unit at which the enemy attacks. 
• 𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎 ∈ 𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆: is the route the enemy attacks. 
• 𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎 ∈ ℝ: is the strength of the enemy (see Section E.4). 
c. Other Constants of Importance  
• Δ𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴: is the maximal volume of a single rare earth element a convoy 
can load onto itself in a time unit. 
• Δ𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴: is the maximal volume of a single rare earth element a 
convoy can unload from itself in a time unit. 
• 𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺.𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀: is the minimal damage per encounter (see Section E.4). 
• 𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺.MAX: is the maximal damage per encounter (see Section E.4). 
• 𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺.𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴R: is the volume of rare earth material lost to the sea by a single 
point of damage during an encounter. 
• 𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎: is a constant (“Big M”) for tracking visits in allied locations. 
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• 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙: is a constant (“Big M”) for tracking factory idle times. 
• 𝑀𝑀𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖: is a constant (“Big M”) for tracking which factories produce which 
weapons.  
d. Decision Variables  
(1) Convoy Variables  
• ∀𝑐𝑐 ∈ 𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆, ℓ ∈ 𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿, 𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝐻𝐻: 𝑋𝑋𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐,ℓ,𝑡𝑡 ∈ {0,1} indicates whether a 
convoy is at a location at that time unit. 
• ∀𝑐𝑐 ∈ 𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆, 𝑟𝑟 ∈ 𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆, 𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝐻𝐻,𝑘𝑘 ∈ 𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐺𝑟𝑟,𝑐𝑐: 𝑋𝑋𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐,𝑟𝑟,𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡 ∈ {0,1} 
indicates whether a convoy is at the 𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡ℎ leg of its journey at a route at that 
time unit. 
• ∀𝑐𝑐 ∈ 𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆, 𝑙𝑙 ∈ 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴, 𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝐻𝐻: 𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐,𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡 ≥ 0 is the volume of a specific 
material carried by a convoy at that time unit. 
• ∀𝑐𝑐 ∈ 𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆, 𝑟𝑟 ∈ 𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆, 𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝐻𝐻: 𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐,𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡 ∈ {0,1} indicates whether a 
convoy is having an encounter on a route at that time unit. 
• ∀𝑐𝑐 ∈ 𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆, 𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝐻𝐻: 𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 ≥ 0 is the damage sustained by a convoy at 
that time unit.  
(2) Location Variables  
• ∀ℓ ∈ 𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿, 𝑙𝑙 ∈ 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴, 𝑐𝑐 ∈ 𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆, 𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝐻𝐻:𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀ℓ,𝑙𝑙,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 ∈ ℝ is the volume of 
a specific material moved from a location to a convoy at that time unit. 
Note that a positive quantity implies the convoy loads material from a 
location, a negative quantity implies the convoy unloads material from a 
location. 
• ∀ℓ ∈ 𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿, 𝑙𝑙 ∈ 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴, 𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝐻𝐻:𝐶𝐶ℓ,𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡 ∈ ℝ+ is the volume of a specific 
material at a certain location at that time unit.  
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(3) Factory Variables  
• ∀𝑓𝑓 ∈ 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆,∀𝑙𝑙 ∈ 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴,∀𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝐻𝐻: 𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓,𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡 ∈ ℝ+ is the volume of a 
specific material consumed for production at a factory at that time unit. 
• ∀𝑓𝑓 ∈ 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆,∀𝑤𝑤 ∈ 𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆,∀𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝐻𝐻: 𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑓𝑓,𝑤𝑤,𝑡𝑡 ∈ ℝ+ is the 
volume of a specific weapon whose production at a specific factory starts 
at that time unit. 
• ∀𝑓𝑓 ∈ 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆,∀𝑤𝑤 ∈ 𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆,∀𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝐻𝐻: 𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑓𝑓,𝑤𝑤,𝑡𝑡 ∈ ℝ+ is the total 
volume of a specific weapon produced by a specific factory by that time 
unit. 
• ∀𝑓𝑓 ∈ 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆, ,∀𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝐻𝐻: 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡 ∈ {0,1} indicates whether a specific 
factory is idle (not producing any weapons) at that time unit. 
• ∀𝑓𝑓 ∈ 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆,∀𝑤𝑤 ∈ 𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆: 𝑀𝑀𝑊𝑊𝑓𝑓,𝑤𝑤 ∈ {0,1} indicates whether a 
specific factory is set to produce a specific weapon.  
(4) Other Variables  
• ∀𝑞𝑞 ∈ 𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹: 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑞𝑞 ∈ {0,1} indicates whether any convoy traveled through a 
location with the specified affiliation. 
E. FORMULATION  
The objective function which we maximized is defined as max∑wiMOPi with the 
following constraints:  
1. Constraints for Convoy Movement  
∀𝑐𝑐 ∈ 𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆, ℓ𝑐𝑐 ≠ ∅:𝑋𝑋𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐,ℓ𝑐𝑐,1 = ℓ𝑐𝑐 
∀𝑐𝑐 ∈ 𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆: ∑ 𝑋𝑋𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐,ℓ,1ℓ∈𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 1  
∀𝑐𝑐 ∈ 𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆, 𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝐻𝐻: ∑ 𝑋𝑋𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐,ℓ,𝑡𝑡ℓ∈𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 + ∑ ∑ 𝑋𝑋𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐,𝑟𝑟,𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘∈𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝑟𝑟,𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟∈𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅 = 1  
∀𝑐𝑐 ∈ 𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆, ℓ ∈ 𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿, 𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝐻𝐻\{𝐹𝐹}: 𝑋𝑋𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐,ℓ,𝑡𝑡 ≤ 𝑋𝑋𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐,ℓ,𝑡𝑡+1 + ∑ ∑ 𝑋𝑋𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐,𝑟𝑟,𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘∈𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝑟𝑟,𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟∈𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿ℓ   
∀𝑐𝑐 ∈ 𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆, 𝑟𝑟 ∈ 𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆, 𝑘𝑘,𝑘𝑘 + 1 ∈ 𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐺𝑟𝑟,𝑐𝑐 , 𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝐻𝐻\{𝐹𝐹}: 𝑋𝑋𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐,𝑟𝑟,𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑋𝑋𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐,𝑟𝑟,𝑘𝑘+1,𝑡𝑡+1 
∀𝑐𝑐 ∈ 𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆, 𝑟𝑟 ∈ 𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆, 𝑘𝑘𝑟𝑟,𝑐𝑐 ∈ 𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐺𝑟𝑟,𝑐𝑐 , 𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝐻𝐻\{𝐹𝐹}: 𝑋𝑋𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐,𝑟𝑟,𝑘𝑘𝑟𝑟,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 ≤ 𝑋𝑋𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐,𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡+1 
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2. Constraints for Material Collection  
∀ℓ ∈ 𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿\𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆, 𝑙𝑙 ∈ 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴: 𝐶𝐶ℓ,𝑙𝑙,1 = 0 
∀𝑚𝑚 ∈ 𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆, 𝑙𝑙 ∈ 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴: 𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚,𝑙𝑙,1 = 𝑣𝑣𝑚𝑚0  
∀ℓ ∈ 𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿, 𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝐻𝐻: � 𝐶𝐶ℓ,𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡
𝑙𝑙∈𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
≤ 𝑐𝑐ℓ 
∀𝑐𝑐 ∈ 𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆, 𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝐻𝐻: � 𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐,𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡
𝑙𝑙∈𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
≤ 𝑢𝑢ℓ 
∀𝑐𝑐 ∈ 𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆,𝑚𝑚 ∈ 𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆, 𝑙𝑙 ∈ 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴, 𝑙𝑙 ≠ 𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚, 𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝐻𝐻:𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚,𝑙𝑙,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 = 0 
∀𝑐𝑐 ∈ 𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆,𝑚𝑚 ∈ 𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆, 𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝐻𝐻:𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚,𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 ≤ Δ𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 ⋅ 𝑋𝑋𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐,𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 
∀𝑐𝑐 ∈ 𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆, 𝑓𝑓 ∈ 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆, 𝑙𝑙 ∈ 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴, 𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝐻𝐻:𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑓𝑓,𝑙𝑙,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 ≤ 0 
∀𝑐𝑐 ∈ 𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆, ℓ ∈ 𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿\(𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆 ∪ 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆), 𝑙𝑙 ∈ 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴, 𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝐻𝐻:𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑓𝑓,𝑙𝑙,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡
≤ Δ𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 ⋅ 𝑋𝑋𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐,𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 
∀𝑐𝑐 ∈ 𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆,𝑚𝑚 ∈ 𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆, 𝑙𝑙 ∈ 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴, 𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝐻𝐻:𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚,𝑙𝑙,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 ≥ 0 
∀𝑐𝑐 ∈ 𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆, ℓ ∈ 𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿\𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆, 𝑙𝑙 ∈ 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴, 𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝐻𝐻:𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑓𝑓,𝑙𝑙,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 ≥ −ΔUN𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 ⋅ 𝑋𝑋𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐,𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 
∀𝑐𝑐 ∈ 𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆, ℓ ∈ 𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿, 𝑙𝑙 ∈ 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴, 𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝐻𝐻:−𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀ℓ,𝑙𝑙,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 ≤ 𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐,𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡 
∀𝑐𝑐 ∈ 𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆, 𝑙𝑙 ∈ 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴, 𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝐻𝐻, 𝑡𝑡 > 1:𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐,𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡
= 𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐,𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡−1 − 𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺.𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 ⋅ 𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 + � 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀ℓ,𝑐𝑐,𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡
ℓ∈𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
 
∀ℓ ∈ 𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿\(𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆 ∪ 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆), 𝑙𝑙 ∈ 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴, 𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝐻𝐻, 𝑡𝑡 > 1:𝐶𝐶ℓ,𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡




∀𝑚𝑚 ∈ 𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆, 𝑙𝑙 ∈ 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴, 𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝐻𝐻, 𝑡𝑡 > 1:𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚,𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡
= 𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚,𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡−1 − � 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚,𝑐𝑐,𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡
𝑐𝑐∈𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅
+ 𝐴𝐴(𝑙𝑙 = 𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚)Δ𝑣𝑣𝑚𝑚 
∀𝑓𝑓 ∈ 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆, 𝑙𝑙 ∈ 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴, 𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝐻𝐻, 𝑡𝑡 > 1:𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚,𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡






3. Constraints for Production  
∀𝑓𝑓 ∈ 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆, 𝑙𝑙 ∈ 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴, 𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝐻𝐻:𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓,𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡 ≤ 𝛼𝛼𝑙𝑙 ⋅ 𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓,𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡 
∀𝑓𝑓 ∈ 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆, 𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝐻𝐻: 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡 ≥ 1 − � 𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑓𝑓,𝑤𝑤,𝑡𝑡
𝑤𝑤∈𝑊𝑊𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅
 
∀𝑓𝑓 ∈ 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆, 𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝐻𝐻:𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 ⋅ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡 ≤ 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 − � 𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑓𝑓,𝑤𝑤,𝑡𝑡
𝑤𝑤∈𝑊𝑊𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅
 
∀𝑓𝑓 ∈ 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆,𝑤𝑤 ∈ 𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆, 𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝐻𝐻:𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑓𝑓,𝑤𝑤,𝑡𝑡 = 0 
∀𝑓𝑓 ∈ 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆,𝑤𝑤 ∈ 𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆, 𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝐻𝐻:𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑓𝑓,𝑤𝑤,𝑡𝑡 = 0 
∀𝑓𝑓 ∈ 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆,𝑤𝑤 ∈ 𝑓𝑓𝑤𝑤, 𝑙𝑙 ∈ 𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙, 𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝐻𝐻: 𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑓𝑓,𝑤𝑤,𝑡𝑡 ≤ 𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓,𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡/𝑣𝑣𝑤𝑤,𝑙𝑙 
∀𝑓𝑓 ∈ 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆,𝑤𝑤 ∈ 𝑓𝑓𝑤𝑤, 𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝐻𝐻\{𝐹𝐹}: 𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑓𝑓,𝑤𝑤,𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑓𝑓,𝑤𝑤,𝑡𝑡 + 𝐴𝐴�𝑡𝑡 > 𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓,𝑤𝑤�𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑓𝑓,𝑤𝑤,𝑡𝑡−𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓,𝑤𝑤 
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∀𝑓𝑓 ∈ 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆,𝑤𝑤 ∈ 𝑓𝑓𝑤𝑤:𝑀𝑀𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ⋅ 𝑀𝑀𝑊𝑊𝑓𝑓,𝑤𝑤 ≥�𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑓𝑓,𝑤𝑤,𝑡𝑡
𝑡𝑡∈𝐻𝐻
 
∀𝑓𝑓 ∈ 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆,𝑤𝑤 ∈ 𝑓𝑓𝑤𝑤:𝑀𝑀𝑊𝑊𝑓𝑓,𝑤𝑤 ≤�𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑓𝑓,𝑤𝑤,𝑡𝑡
𝑡𝑡∈𝐻𝐻
 
4. Combat Constraints  
















∀𝑐𝑐 ∈ 𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆, 𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝐻𝐻:𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 ≥ �
1
𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐





∀𝑐𝑐 ∈ 𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆, 𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝐻𝐻:𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 ≥ 𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺.𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀 ⋅ ( � 𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐,𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡
𝑟𝑟∈𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅
) 
∀𝑐𝑐 ∈ 𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆, 𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝐻𝐻:𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 ≤ 𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺.𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑋𝑋 ⋅ ( � 𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐,𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡
𝑟𝑟∈𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅
) 
5. Other Constraints  
∀𝑞𝑞 ∈ 𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹:𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎 ⋅ 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑞𝑞 ≥ � � �𝑋𝑋𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐,ℓ,𝑡𝑡
𝑡𝑡∈𝐻𝐻ℓ∈𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑞𝑞ℓ=𝑞𝑞,𝑐𝑐∈𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅
 
∀𝑞𝑞 ∈ 𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹:𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑞𝑞 ≤ � � �𝑋𝑋𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐,ℓ,𝑡𝑡
𝑡𝑡∈𝐻𝐻ℓ∈𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑞𝑞ℓ=𝑞𝑞,𝑐𝑐∈𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅
 
6. Production Process  
To produce a weapon component, we define a production equation. The equation 
states the minimal volume of different materials required to produce a unit volume of a 
weapon component. Once a factory has enough material shipped by convoys, production 
can start. To account for the required refinement process, only a certain percentage of the 
material within the factory is usable for the sake of production. We also note that the time 
until production is completed is dependent on the specific technology and resources each 
factory has.  
The production equation can be written explicitly using the previously presented 
notations (Figure 23):  
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Figure 23. Production Equation  
7. Damage to a Convoy During an Encounter 
If a convoy 𝑐𝑐 ∈ CONVOYS encounters a set of enemies ENEMIESc ⊂ 𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆, 
it sustains damage equal to: 
DMGc = min �
∑ paa∈ENEMIESc − pc
max{dc, ϵ}
, DMG. MIN� 
That is, we sum the total strength of all engaged enemies, subtract the convoy’s 
counterfire strength, and then divide by the convoy’s defense. Note that the expression 
min{𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐 , 𝜖𝜖} ensures we do not divide by 0. The damage cannot be reduced below 
𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺.𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀.  
For each point of damage, a fraction of each material carried by the damaged 
convoy is lost to the sea. That fraction is denoted by 𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺.𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴.  
F. SIMULATION MODEL  
The optimization model just described accounts for static data. However, when 
accounting for hazards such as the existence of enemies, we want to ensure our model can 
account for enemies of varying patterns of attack. To that end, we wrap our optimization 
model with a simulation-oriented approach: we randomly generate information about 
enemies, according to a simple model described in the following paragraphs, and then feed 
the results into our optimization model.  
1. Enemy Metamodel  
Note that we have already described the information required to generate enemies: 
• 𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎 ∈ 𝐻𝐻: is the time unit at which the enemy attacks. 
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• 𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎 ∈ 𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆: is the route the enemy attacks. 
• 𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎 ∈ ℝ: is the strength of the enemy. 
While 𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎 and 𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎 are problem data, to generate 𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎 we use the following technique: 
every simulation run, for each 𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎, 𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎 at which an enemy should appear, we let 𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎 be the 
number of enemies to potentially attack the route at that time and 𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎 the probability that 
each independent enemy appears during that attack. 𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎 and 𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎 embed some information 
about any intelligence reports or wargaming analysis we may have when trying to predict 
enemy attacks. Observe that the actual number of enemies to appear is binomially 
distributed with parameters 𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎 and 𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎. The strength of the group of enemies 𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎 is the sum 
of all enemies that appear.  
2. Design of Experiment  
Each run of the simulation defines a set of parameters for each group of enemies 
that (potentially) appear during the time horizon. This set includes 𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎, 𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎,𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎,𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎 and the 
individual strength of each enemy (denoted here by 𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎′). For 𝑛𝑛 locations with 𝑀𝑀(𝑛𝑛2) routes, 
the number of parameters is defined as 𝑀𝑀(𝐹𝐹𝑛𝑛2).  
We relax the requirement for full coverage of the design space by creating a 
designated set of routes 𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆.𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴 ⊂ 𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆, such that the only routes 
at which enemies can appear must be routes from 𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆.𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴. Therefore, 
each run of simulations requires only the four parameters shown in Table 5.  
Table 5. Adversary Parameter Space for Experimentation  
Parameter Type Range 
𝒕𝒕𝒂𝒂 Integer 𝐻𝐻 = {1,2, … ,𝐹𝐹} (time horizon) 
𝑵𝑵𝒂𝒂  Integer [0, 10] 
𝑷𝑷𝒂𝒂 Continuous [0,1] (probability) 
𝒑𝒑𝒂𝒂′ Continuous [1,10] 
 
As the table suggests, the design space for each route in 𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆.𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴 
is still extremely large. To address this limitation, we use an NOLH (nearly orthogonal 
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linear hypercubes) design with 113 sample points in this space, rounding down the values 
for 𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎 and 𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎.  
G. ALTERNATIVE DESIGN USING THE MODEL  
This section discusses how one can use the model to design alternatives. We 
describe the specific details for each alternative in the context of our examined scenarios.  
1. Fleet Design  
An important aspect of alternative design using the model is the fleet design, 
specifically the composition and characteristics of convoys. As already explained, we can 
control how many convoys we have, how fast they move, what their capacity is and even 
their combat capabilities. However, these are not decision variables but rather input 
parameters that reflect a decision made by decision makers when designing the system.  
2. Location Design  
The second aspect of alternative design is location design. This aspect has to do 
with both the choices of where to extract material from as well as which factories should 
produce components from the extracted material. Location design entails the potential to 
explore both existing locations (mines) but also locations that do not necessarily exist yet 
(such as factories that could be established by the year 2030). In this work, we attempt to 
keep exact factory locations abstract and not address any specific factories in existence. 
H. EXAMINED SCENARIO 
The scenario we examined using the model takes place in a limited time horizon in 
which the United States and its allies must maximize production in accordance with the 
MOPs while being targeted by attacks along routes crossing the Indian Ocean and the 
Pacific. We specifically explore the production of stabilization magnets from Neodymium, 
a rare earth metal.  
This scenario entails exploration of three core alternatives with three variants.  
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1. Alternative 1: Produce Locally  
In this alternative, production of components is limited to within CONUS. 
2. Alternative 2: Produce Remotely  
In this alternative, production of components is limited to outside CONUS only. 
3. Alternative 3: Produce “Near Me”  
In this alternative, production is not limited geographically, but rather optimized 
according to the MOPs directly. 
 
As mentioned, these alternatives focus on Location Design. We have three variants 
for each alternative that focus on Fleet Design. The variants use either small-and-fast 
convoys, medium-and-fast convoys, or large-and-slow convoys. 
The model was also optimized on two specific areas, namely, material collection 
and component production. For material collection, there was no specific designation per 
alternative/variant and the model was programmed to choose the best source based on the 
problem parameters. Meanwhile, the component production was alternative-dependent as 
different regions have different production procedures and regulations, which translates 
into different production times.  
I. DATA AND ASSUMPTIONS  
While most of the data used in this model is based on our literature review, there 
are gaps in the model data requirements.  
Figure 24 depicts the overview of the input data used for the model. The input data 
used in the model were unclassified information and can be obtained from open sources. 
Due to the limited information available in open sources, some assumptions had to be made 
for the model to run and make the necessary analysis. The input data can be classified into 




Figure 24. Overview of Input Data 
In addition to this, Tables 6 through 8 summarize the data used for the mines, 
convoys, and distances between nodes in the model.   
Table 6. Mine Data 
Name Capacity (MT) Volume Per Time 
California (Mountain Pass) 100000 216.67 
India 100000 25 
Myanmar 100000 183.333 
Australia (Mount Weld) 100000 175 
Table 7. Convoy Data  
Name Type Speed  (Normalized) Capacity  (MT) Defense  (Normalized) 
Small Container Sea 3 500 10 
Medium Container Sea 2 6000 20 
Large Container Sea 2 30000 20 
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Table 8. Distances between Location Nodes  
Source Destination Distance (mi) 
California (Mountain Pass) Texas 1500 
California (Mountain Pass) Virginia 2500 
California (Mountain Pass) Australia (Melbourne) 8400 
California (Mountain Pass) Myanmar 12000 
California (Mountain Pass) India 13000 
California (San Francisco) Texas 1500 
California (San Francisco) Virginia 2500 
California (San Francisco) Australia (Melbourne) 8400 
California (San Francisco) Myanmar 12000 
California (San Francisco) India 13000 
California (San Francisco) California (Mountain Pass) 1500 
Texas Virginia 1500 
Virginia Europe 4400 
Europe Texas 6000 
Europe California (Mountain Pass) 8000 
Europe California (San Francisco) 8000 
Europe India 7700 
Europe Myanmar 8000 
Australia (Mount Weld) India 3000 
Australia (Mount Weld) Myanmar 4500 
Australia (Melbourne) India 3000 
Australia (Melbourne) Myanmar 4500 
Australia (Mount Weld) Australia (Melbourne) 1500 
South America Australia (Melbourne) 8000 
 
In addition to these data points, we made the following modeling assumptions.  
• Distances between any two points in the ‘model’ world are normalized 
such that 1-time unit is equivalent to three days at most.  
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• Time horizon used in the model optimizes over 15-time units (equivalent 
to a 45-day period).  
• For the REE mines, the rate of REE refinement for each mine used in the 
model is 0.06.  
• Approximately 5.37 units of permanent magnets for weapon systems can 
be produced per mton of REE material (Neodymium).  
J. ALTERNATIVE DESIGNS  
For the first alternative design, Produce Locally, the system focused on producing 
components only within CONUS, as shown in Figure 25. In this alternative design, the 
only possible factories are those within CONUS, with one on the east coast and one on the 
west coast. The material (neodymium) can be collected from Australia, India, or California.  
 
Figure 25. Alternative 1: Produce Locally 
For the second alternative design shown in Figure 26, Produce Remotely, the 
system focused on producing components only outside CONUS, exploiting the potential 
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proximity of non-U.S. mines to factories, and the possibility to reduce costs. In this 
alternative design, the selected factories are outside CONUS, potentially either in Australia 
or in Europe while the material (neodymium) can be collected from Australia, India, or 
California.  
 
Figure 26. Alternative 2: Produce Remotely  
For the third alternative design shown in Figure 27, Produce “Near Me,” the system 
is not necessarily bounded by any geographical location. It is the most extreme case, where 
components (before being shipped to front bases) are potentially scattered across several 
locations, both CONUS and non-CONUS. In this alternative design, all options are 




Figure 27. Alternative 3: Produce “Near Me”  
The simulation was run by exploring a specific scenario that includes adversarial 
attempts. Several simulation runs were conducted with different input parameters, to 
explore the variability of each alternative and variant, as well as the effect of the choice of 




V. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
This chapter discusses the implementation of the scenario from the previous chapter 
and analyzes the results of that implementation. Whereas in the previous chapter we 
discussed alternatives and input data, here we describe how to incorporate the system 
engineering process and the MOPs defined by that process into our model. We then 
highlight key insights and outputs resulting from running the model on our examined 
scenario.  
A. MEASURE OF PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS  
The system engineering process has defined 14 MOPs to maximize or minimize for 
our examined scenario. In this section, we describe how we integrate these MOPs into our 
scenario modeling and analysis. We begin by discussing the associated system engineering 
process that transforms the MOPs for our scenario into scalars (weights) provided to our 
optimization model.  
1. Value Functions  
The value functions facilitate the conversion of raw candidate scores or data into 
normalized utility scores before applying a global swing weight approach for building an 
aggregate value score for each alterative. For instance, in the case of P.2 (total number of 
components produced by allied countries), among the three alternatives we find that the 
total number of components varies from 0 to 17. The first step is to bound the x-axis of the 
value curve in question based on the minimum number of components that would yield no 
value. Next, the analyst would fit the appropriate line or curve (in this case a negative linear 
function) to the assessed value. Then, one can interpolate the relative value of each 
alternative by finding the utility score as a function of the fitted line or curve. The result is 
three normalized value scores capable of comparing the candidate solutions. Lastly, the 
sum product of the value scores and their respective global swing weights captures the total 
comparable utility of each candidate solution.  
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For the producibility COI, three simple linear relationships exist between the raw 
scores and their associated utility. For P.1 (refer to Figure 28 for definition) there is an 
inverse relationship between the rate and its value since lower is better considering that the 
metric essentially describes the efficiency of productivity. For P.2 and P.3 the opposite is 
true; the total number of components produced, and total volume of material collected 
follows a positive linear trend since more is better. Finally, the time to manufacture an 
individual component (P.4) exhibits a negative relationship.  
 
Figure 28. Measures of Effectiveness/Performance Value Curves for 
Producibility COI 
For the transportability COI, the first two measures assume a positive linear 
relationship between the raw scores and utility, considering that the desire is to maximize 
survivability (which is what T.1 attempts to capture by creating a rate between enemy 
encounters and lost cargo) and maximize the amount of storage space per vessel. 
Alternatively, T.3 and T.6 follow a negative linear relationship since more distance covered 
and more time spent traveling equate to increased risk. Lastly, the T.4 and T.5 value 
measures follow a negative s-curve shape since they are influenced by a threshold of 
tolerance. For example, the number of sovereign territories traversed is tolerable to the 
extent of our ability to coordinate with allied nations. The same is true regarding the total 
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number of convoys at any given time based on the nation’s capacity to defend multiple 
convoys. As result, the consequences of exceeding capacity become dramatically worse as 
values increase, hence the dramatic decrease in value towards the latter portion of the curve. 
These relationships are shown in Figure 29.  
 
Figure 29. Measure of Effectiveness/Performance Value Curves for 
Producibility COI 
For the availability COI, a positive s-curve applies for A.1 since this measure 
effectively represents a factory’s utilization rate. The s-curve relationship penalizes 
underutilized factories while rewarding those that reach their optimal performance level 
before a dramatically decreasing value as factories approach their maximum utilization 
rates.  The premise is that factories tend to experience catastrophic failures and worker 
fatigue at maximum capacity, but also experience extreme inefficiency at low utilization 
rates. The A.2 MOP, however, measures the average quantity of material on hand. This 
essentially represents the cached material that is readily available. In this case, the value 
experiences diminishing marginal returns indicative of the concave value curve seen on the 
middle-right side of Figure 30.  In theory, the value of having additional material on-hand 
diminishes as the cost of storage rises. Lastly, the final two metrics (A.3 and A.4) follow a 
positive linear trend since more is better regarding raw materials delivered and collected.  
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Figure 30. Measures of Effectiveness/Performance Value Curves for 
Availability COI  
2. Global Swing Weights  
In a parallel effort, this study developed swing weights based on the prioritization 
of MOPs and the variability within their raw scores. Of note, each preceding value measure 
outranks the following based on the stakeholder’s analysis and expert opinion. By ranking 
the MOPs and measuring the variability within each measure, this research applied a multi-
objective decision analysis technique known as the “swing weight matrix” (Parnell and 
Trainor 2009) as an objective approach to assessing each alternative’s overall utility. 
Before constructing the matrix, however, this study measured the variability within the raw 
data using coefficients of variation (CV). Figure 31 illustrates the formula for calculating 
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Figure 31. Coefficient of Variance Calculation  
Table 9 shows the results of the CV analysis.  
Table 9. Level of Variation by Measure of Performance  
MOP CV Variation 
P.1 33% L 
P.2 78% H 
P.3 77% H 
P.4 65% M 
T.1 187% H 
T.2 109% H 
T.3 14% L 
T.4 82% H 
T.5 8% L 
T.6 8% L 
A.1 46% M 
A.2 17% L 
A.3 29% L 
A.4 33% L 
 
To construct the global swing weight matrix, this research placed each MOP within 
the matrix based on its level of importance (across the top of Figure 32) and variation of 
scale (down the left side of Figure 32). Each block within the matrix carries a specified 
weight between 1 and 100 that decreases in value from top-left to bottom-right. In doing 
so, a measure can only achieve the highest weight if it is most important to the stakeholders 
and contains high variation within the MOP data. Greater variation equates to increased 
value based on the MOPs ability to better differentiate between alternatives (Parnell and 
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Trainor 2009). Figure 32 displays the complete matrix overlaid with the MOPs. Each 
individual box includes (from top to bottom) the MOP (bold text), individual weight 
(standard text), and normalized global swing weight (italicized text).  
 
Figure 32. Global Swing Weight Matrix. Adapted from Parnell and 
Trainor (2009).  
Finally, the raw metrics from the modeling results can filter through the value 
functions before applying the global swing weights to determine each alternative’s total 
utility. However, this study then returns to the modeling process to optimize results using 
the newly minted global swing weights.  
3. Measure of Performance Weights for Optimization  
The final weights are shown in Table 10.  
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Table 10. Optimization Model Swing Weigh Values 
MOP S/N MOP Swing Weights 
Producibility 
P.1 
Ratio of total material consumed for weapons 
production and total number of components 
produced by factory 
0.1343 
P.2 Total number of components produced by allied factories 0.1343 
P.3 Total volume of material collected from allied mines 0.1194 
P.4 Total time to manufacture an individual component 0.1045 
Transportability 
T.1 Ratio of enemy encounters and lost cargo/ships 0.1045 
T.2 Average amount of storage space available by vessel 0.0896 
T.3 Total (normalized) distance covered by convoys 0.0597 
T.4 Total number of distinct sovereign territories traversed 0.0746 
T.5 Average number of convoys in transit at any given time 0.0448 
T.6 Total time spent by convoys in transit 0.0448 
Availability 
A.1 Average utilization rate of factories (inverse of idle time) 0.0448 
A.2 Average quantity of raw material on hand 0.0149 
A.3 Total amount of raw material delivered to factories 0.0149 
A.4 Total amount of material collected from mines 0.0149 
    Total: 1 
 
These weights become the input to our optimization model described in the 
previous chapter. We note that for MOPs, with adjustment of sign (multiplied by −1) for 
MOPs with a decreasing or generally decreasing value function. We should also note that 
a ratio of functions 𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥)/𝑔𝑔(𝑥𝑥) will be maximized by our optimization scheme, in this case 
by maximizing the approximate value 𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥) − 𝑔𝑔(𝑥𝑥).  
B. SCENARIO RESULTS  
This section discusses the total objective and the specific measure of performance 
results gathered from execution of the model.  
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1. Total Objective Results  
The graphic in Figure 33 shows the normalized objective values separated by 
alternative and location of production. As evidenced by Figure 33, when components are 
Produced Remotely and “Near Me” they tend to perform best and are almost identical when 
using both medium and large convoys. The Produce Locally alternative performs the worst 
for all convoy variants emphasizing that, when possible, production overseas is best. 
Another key insight detailed by these results is that when shipping is done in small 
quantities, the production of weapons components will be hindered, yielding a component 
reduction of ~50% or more across all alternatives. Furthermore, this graph implies that load 
capacity is a superior characteristic in determining the efficiency of the shipping method.  
 
Figure 33. Normalized Objective Values by Alternative and Location 
of Production  
Figure 33 represents an optimized solution for a 45-day period; however, projecting 
these same conditions over longer periods may yield a different solution. Objectively, it 
makes sense to manufacture the parts outside of the United States, but this output does not 
consider losses that could be associated with transporting the final weapon component (i.e., 
magnets) to the weapon system in what is referred to as the “last mile.”  
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2. Specific Measure of Performance Results  
We have noticed that the planner optimizes the production of components in 
accordance with the volume ratio between Neodymium and a singular stabilization magnet. 
Therefore, all alternatives yield the same production-consumption ratio. On the other hand, 
we can see differences in the raw number of components produced, shown in Figure 34.  
 
Figure 34. Raw Number of Components Produced  
Weapon production is a function of the REE being refined and then manufactured 
into a usable component, i.e., magnets or actuators. Figure 34 indicates that the most 
efficient way of producing weapon components is by using medium container ships to 
transport raw REEs from mines located overseas. Additionally, another key insight is that 
using small but fast convoys is only viable when producing components locally, most likely 
attributed to the reduction in distance between mine and component manufacturing facility. 
Finally, the difference between the production of components using medium and large 
containers is negligible, meaning that either method would provide adequate component 
production.  
We can also see that for the Produce Locally, the volume of material collected at 
non-U.S. mines is the lowest, with only 85% collected from non-U.S. mines. Other 
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alternatives collect almost exclusively from non-U.S. mines.  Figure 35 shows that 
Producing “Near Me” with large containers ships causes the greatest dependence on REE 
materials from foreign countries, with the use of medium ships just behind.  Dependence 
on materials from foreign countries is a function of where the materials are taken to be 
produced.  Interestingly, for Produce Locally, when using small ships, the percentage of 
material collected from foreign countries jumps by 10%, which brings it close to the same 
dependence as all other options.  
 
Figure 35. Volume of Material Collected in non-CONUS Locations  
In terms of robustness to adversarial attacks, as shown in Figure 36, Produce 
Remotely is the most varied and most vulnerable option. This can be attributed to the 
increased distance required to transport materials to the production facilities. Production 
by allied forces is a viable solution to manage the resistance of potential threats. As 
mentioned in Chapter II (Section D.1), having a diverse supply chain network can greatly 
help mitigate supply chain choke points, should a conflict ensue. Insomuch, when allied 
forces are responsible for manufacturing weapon components there is also an increase in 
the potential material loses (see Figure 36).  
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Figure 36. Material Lost to Adversarial Attempts  
As expected, Produce Locally requires the least amount of time spent by convoys 
in transit (that is, time not spent in loading or unloading material). Due to capacity limits, 
we see that for the most part the small convoy variants spend less time than other variants 
in transit.  As can be seen in Figure 37, Produce Remotely and Produce “Near Me” produce 
very similar results, with Produce Remotely having just slightly less time in transit.  Transit 
time for Produce Locally did not depend on the size of container ship used as they were all 
about the same.  When using either the Produce Remotely or Produce “Near Me” 
alternatives, the use of a large or medium ship significantly increased the average amount 
of time spent in transit.  
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Figure 37. Average Time Spent in Transit  
The utilization rate was maximized in the Produce Remotely scenario with either 
large, slow convoys or medium, fast convoys. Producing remotely allowed mined materials 
to be shipped to factories closer to the point of origin. The steady stream of materials 
allowed the factories to produce on a more regular schedule than any of the other scenarios.  
In any given alternative shown in Figure 38, the small, fast convoys minimized the 
utilization rate while large and medium sized convoys had nearly equal utilization rates for 
each alternative. This indicates that small, fast convoys are not able to match the rate at 
which factories can turn the raw materials into weapons. Small, fast convoys create a 
bottleneck in all three alternatives.  
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Figure 38. Average Factory Utilization  
C. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION FOR FUTURE WORK  
In this work, we addressed the issues of designing a supply chain in a contested 
environment when focused on “metal delivery”. Our approach to this problem was to tackle 
the processes required to produce weapon components necessary to maintain long-term 
combat. We have identified key processes, such as the mining of rare earth metals, 
refinement of material, transportation of material through various locations of interest, and 
finally, production of components through means of transforming the material into a usable 
object.  
Our work showed there are inherit challenges in a system designed to address the 
problem statement. Some of these challenges are physical in nature such as the precise 
geographical locations at which some rare earth metals are available or the time required 
to produce a component. Other challenges stem from adversarial effects of attempts to 
hinder our efforts. The large scale of operation across time, space, and alternative spaces 
add to the complexities we encountered.  
In particular, we focused our attention on a scenario in which the system operates 
within a 45-day window immediately and without prior warning, while being contested 
along the Pacific and Indian Oceans, limiting the operability of our convoys to move 
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westward from the United States into Asia. This scenario is both relevant and captures 
many of the challenges and elements we identified as vital to create a robust supply chain. 
We used a Design-of-Experiment approach combined with large-scale optimization 
methods to model and analyze this scenario.  
Our results show that allowing the production process to take place near the mining 
process alongside a sufficiently large convoy to carry material from location-to-location 
lead to the best results. We called this alternative Produce “Near Me” because, from the 
perspective of the convoy, it reflects the convoy’s intent to carry collected material across 
the best (shortest and safest) route possible, without concerning for geopolitical constraints, 
such as having to produce components outside the United States.  
We observed that there are some subtle differences between using an M convoy – 
speedy and sufficiently large in capacity – and an L convoy – slowest but largest in 
capacity. We deem both of these convoy designs as suitable, while noting that external 
factors we did not examine, such as equipment cost and maintenance, may alter our 
analysis. We also wish to note that for time period longer than 45 days, the increased speed 
of the M convoy may prove useful. 
Our process was limited by the availability of data, and we highly recommend that 
more precise and often classified data will be employed in our designed model moving 
forward. We also note that exploration of more complex fleet designs and smaller and/or 
larger time periods may shed more light about the performance of the proposed 
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